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INTRODUCTION

Intestacy is an area in which same-sex couples receive little legal protec
tion of their relationships. For a surviving same-sex spouse, this can result in
complete disinheritance and defeat the intentions of the couple.
Intestacy occurs when an individual dies without a valid will. In the ab
sence of a valid will, certain default rules apply to the distribution of the
decedent's property.1 Intestacy statutes in most jurisdictions provide that the
2
surviving spouse takes all or most of the decedent's estate. But intestacy
3
laws protect only the rights of lawfully married survivors, and in states that
do not recognize same-sex marriages or civil unions, the estate will be dis
tributed to distant relatives, or even escheat to the state, rather than benefit
4
the surviving partner to the marriage or union.
Establishing domicile in the jurisdiction where the same-sex marriage or
civil union occurred protects surviving same-sex partners because a state's
recognition of same-sex marriage means that its intestacy laws likely recog
5
nize same-sex marriage as well. If the decedent later dies in another
jurisdiction, however, many states will not consider the surviving partner a
"spouse" for the purposes of intestacy, and as a result, the survivor of the
same-sex union is disinherited of the wealth that was likely jointly gener-

I.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF

PRor.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS ch. 2 (1999)

(discussing common patterns of intestacy statutes in the United States).

2.
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE§ 2- 102( 1) ( 1990). The surviving spouse takes the entire estate
if no parent or descendant also survives the decedent, or if all of the surviving descendants are also
the descendants of the surviving spouse and there is no other descendant of the surviving spouse
who survives the decedent. Uniform Probate Code section 2 -102(2)-(4) provides for a flat amount
plus a percentage of the remaining estate in cases where there are other eligible takers who survive
the decedent. In most small to moderately sized estates, the spouse's share still consumes the entire
estate. Professor Waggoner notes that "the grant to the spouse of the entire intestate estate is aligned
with trends in intestate-succession law throughout the United States and Europe." Lawrence
Waggoner, The Multiple-Marriage Society and Spousal Rights under the Revised Uniform Probate
Code, 76 IOWA L. REV. 223, 230-31 ( 199 1).
3.
A narrow exception exists in some states for "putative spouses" who believed in good
faith that they were parties to a valid marriage. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.2 cmt. e. The Uniform Probate Code does not address the rights of puta
tive spouses.
4.
"The devolution of interests in movables upon intestacy is detennined by the law that
would be applied by the courts of the state where the decedent was domiciled at the time of his
death." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 260 ( 1969); accord UN IF. PROBATE CODE
§ 1-301( 1); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 236(1) (The "devolution of
interests in land upon the death of the owner intestate is determined by the law that would be ap
plied by the courts of the situs."). The Uniform Probate Code§ 2-105 provides that the intestate
estate passes to the state if there is no taker under the provisions of the Article. UN IF . PROBATE
CODE§ 2-105.

5.
If a state allows same-sex couples to marry, they become entitled upon marriage to all of
the attendant benefits, including the right to automatically "inherit the property of a deceased spouse
who does not leave a will. " Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955 (Mass. 2003);
see also About.com, Benefits of Gay Civil Unions, http://gaylife.about.com/cs/gaymarriage/a/
cdm.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2006) (stating that the benefits to civil unions include benefits under
the laws of intestate succession).

June 2006)

Free Will to W ill ?

1765

6
ated. Courts in these states cite the public policy exception to the Full Faith
and Credit Clause of the Constitution as the rationale for refusing to honor
the marriage for the purposes of intestacy.7 The Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA) interpreted the Full Faith and Credit Clause as containing an ex
ception to the requirement of recognition for marriages that contravene the
8
public policy of the state. Because several states have recently provided
benefits to same-sex couples, this is only the beginning of debate over same
sex relationships.9
This Note argues that courts should recognize intestacy rights for same
sex couples that were validly married or civilly united in a state other than
the one in which one of the partners died. Courts may validly recognize the
marriage for intestacy purposes, even while refusing to recognize the mar
riage as against public policy. Part I details the recent provision of benefits
in various states to same-sex couples. Part II argues that same-sex couples
cannot necessarily rely on wills to effectuate their intent to leave their prop
erty to their spouses. Part III argues that when states refuse to recognize the
marriages or civil unions of same-sex couples as being against the public
policy of the state, they erroneously reject same-sex intestacy rights, creat
ing a gap in the protection afforded to same-sex couples and defeating their
likely intent. Part IV provides examples from case law permitting states to
recognize intestacy rights--despite a general refusal to recognize the mar
riage-for surviving spouses of couples whose marriage violated the state's
public policy. Part V concludes that courts should limit this recognition of
intestacy rights to same-sex couples who are validly married, or participated
in a civil union or commitment ceremony, in order to avoid fraud and un
necessary litigation.

6. See supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also In re Cooper, 592 N. Y. S. 2d 797, 801
(App. Div. 1993) ("[W]e agree with [the acting surrogate's] conclusion that 'purported [homosex
ual] marriages do not give rise to any rights' " pursuant to the state's intestacy statute.).
7. The Full Faith and Credit Clause provides that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in
each State to the public Acts, R ecords, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.And the Con
gress may by general Laws prescribe the M anner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall
be proved, and the Effect thereof." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I.
8. DOMA provides, "No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe,
shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other S tate,
territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is
treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or
claim arising from such relationship." 28 U.S . C. § 1738C (2006). Opposite-sex marriages from
other states are nearly always recognized through Full Faith and Credit. "[T]he general rule is that
the validity of a marriage is governed by the law of the place where it is contracted, or celebrated."
52 AM. JUR. 2o Marriage § 63 (2005). Same-sex marriages, on the other hand, are often given no
effect as a result of the public policy exception to Full Faith and Credit. Lynn Wardle notes that
"forty states .. . have enacted state Defense of Marriage Acts (DOMAs) establishing that same-sex
marriage will not be recognized in those jurisdictions." Lynn D.Wardle, Non-Recognition of Same
Sex Marriage Judgments Under DOMA and the Constitution, 38 CREIGHTON L. R EV 365, 370
(2005).Professor Wardle continues, "(t]here appears to be little room for doubt that Congress in
tended to allow each state, in appropriate circumstances, to decline to recognize or enforce sister
state judgments treating same-sex relationships as marriages." Id. at 371.
9.

See infra Part I.
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BACKGROUND: THE RISE OF BENEFITS TO SAME-SEX C OUPLES

The provision of benefits to same-sex couples is incredibly disparate
across different states. The few states and municipalities that extend rights
to same-sex couples are in stark contrast to the lack of protections afforded
at the federal level, where the government has sought to deny the protections
1
of opposite-sex marriage to same-sex couples through DOMA. 0 This Part
briefly describes of some of the rights recently gained by same-sex couples
in the United States.
In Baehr v. Lewin, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that restriction of
marriage to opposite-sex couples violated the Hawaii Constitution's Equal
11
Protection Clause. The court remanded to the trial court for a determina
12
tion of whether a compelling state interest justified the restriction. The trial
13
court in Baehr v. Miike determined that the state did not meet this burden.
In response to these judicial rulings that gave same-sex and opposite-sex
Hawaiian couples some of the benefits of marriage upon registration of their
relationship, the Hawaii state legislature passed the Reciprocal Beneficiaries
14
Act. Subsequently, however, Hawaii amended the state constitution to al
low the legislature to define marriage as a union between a man and a
15
woman.
Similar to the court in Hawaii, the Vermont Supreme Court determined
that denial of marital rights to same-sex couples violated the Vermont State
16
Constitution. In response to the decision, the legislature created a union
that parallels marriage for same-sex couples.17 The Civil Union Law gives
18
all of the benefits of marriage to same-sex participants.
California has had a mixed history with respect to rights for same-sex
couples. On the one hand, California has created a registry with the Secre
tary of State through which certain same-sex couples may register their
partnership for the purpose of receiving benefits similar to those accorded
by marriage, including death and survivorship benefits. 19 Additionally, on
February 12, 2004, San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom ordered city clerks

I 0.

Theresa Glennon, An American Perspective on the Debate Over the Harmonisation or
FAM. L.Q. 185 (2004) (book review).

Unification ofFamily law in Europe, 38

11.

Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).

12.

Id.

13.

Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).

at 68.

14.

HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572C-3 to -5 (1994).

15.

HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23.

16.

Baker v. Vermont, 744 A. 2d 864 (Vt. 1999).

17.

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-07 (2002).

id. The couple is not considered married, however. The law creates a separate cate
gory to define the union of same-sex individuals.
18.

See

For more information on this interesting concept and some of its limitations-including
19.
the fact that it is currently limited to same-sex couples with one partner sixty-two years of age or
older-see the California Secretary of State's Domestic Partner's Registry, http://www.ss.ca.gov/
dpregistry/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
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20
to begin issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples. The California Su
preme Court, however, eventually voided all of the marriages performed in
2004 in San Francisco and elsewhere, leaving in their wake lawsuits chal
21
lenging restrictions on same-sex marriage. On September 6, 2005,
California lawmakers became the first in the country that voted to legalize
same-sex marriage, with the State Assembly narrowly approving a bill that
defines marriage as between "two persons" instead of between a man and a
22
woman. In another setback to same-sex couples, though, and consistent
with his public pronouncements on the subject, Governor Schwarzenegger
vetoed the bill.23 The ultimate outcome of these movements, and therefore
the status of same-sex relationships, is likely far from over. As a result, it is
unclear how a California court would respond to a claim by a surviving
same-sex partner for intestacy rights.
Same-sex couples in Massachusetts were given the right to marry24 in
25
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health. The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court determined that the exclusion of same-sex couples from mar
riage violates the Massachusetts Constitution, and the court redefined the
common law meaning of marriage to include "the voluntary union of two
persons as spouses, to the exclusion of all others."26
New York provides an impressive example of inclusivity for same-sex
couples through statutory interpretation and policy-making. The New York
Court of Appeals recognized the rights of a same-sex couple in the landmark
case of Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co. by defining family to include same
sex partners.27 The landlord in Braschi sought to evict the same-sex partner
of a tenant who died in a rent-controlled apartment building.28 The court
extended the non-eviction protection of New York City's rent-control regula
tion to the surviving partner by defining fam ily to include same-sex partners,
thereby preventing his eviction.29 Additionally, in 1998, the city extended its
protection of the rights of same-sex couples by passing its Domestic

20. NOLO, Same-Sex Marriage: Developments in the Law, http://www.keepmedia.com/
(enter a search for "Same-Sex Marriage: Developments in the Law"; then click on "Same-Sex Mar
riage: Developments in the Law") (last visited Apr. 1 9, 2006).
21 .

Id.

22. Dean E. Murphy, Same Sex Marriage Wins Vote in California, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2005,
at A 14. This is in contrast to Massachusetts, where same-sex marriage was legalized at the behest of
courts after a determination that it was unconstitutional to restrict marriage to one man and one
woman. See infra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
23. Associated Press, Same-Sex Marriage Bill Vetoed, Sept. 9, 2005, http:// www.cbsnews.
com/stories/2005/09/29/politics/main89 I 622. shtml.
24.

They were also given the right to have their relationship called a marriage rather than a

civil union.

25.

798 N.E.2d 94 1 (Mass. 2003).

26.

Id.

27.

Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1 989).

28.

Id.

at 50-5 1 .

29.

Id.

at 53-54.

at 969.
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Partnership Law.30 The New York City Council further extended its protec
tions by automatically recognizing couples as domestic partners if they were
parties to civil unions or same-sex marriages, or they had registered as do
31
mestic partners in other jurisdictions.
In addition to recognition of rights at the state level, certain employers
32
and municipalities have granted rights and benefits to same-sex couples.
Many private employers have extended benefits to same-sex partners of em
33
ployees that were previously available only to spouses.
With the exception of these limited protections, same-sex couples face
severe disadvantages compared to the rights afforded heterosexual married
couples. In particular, parties to a civil union or same-sex marriage are de
nied an intestate share if they are domiciled in a state that refuses to
recognize their relationship and applies its intestacy laws to the decedent's
estate.34 As shown in the next Part, same-sex couples cannot necessarily rely
on wills to achieve the desired distribution of their estates.
II.

PROBLEMS WITH RELYING ON WILLS TO REFLECT
ACTUAL DONATIVE INTENT

Testamentary planning is at best an incomplete substitute for the broader
legal recognition of intestacy rights for same-sex relationships. Although
effective testamentary planning would obviate the need for recognition of
same-sex intestacy rights, it has some possible shortcomings. Relying on
wills to accurately reflect a decedent's intent is problematic for three rea
sons: relatives of the decedent may successfully challenge a will leaving
most or all of the estate to a same-sex partner, a home-drawn will may fail
for defects in execution,35 or couples in a civil union or same-sex marriage
may neglect to make wills at all, assuming that their union or marital status
will protect them in the event one dies. The next three Sections will discuss
these challenges in turn.

30.

N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, §§ 240-245 (2005).

31.

Id.

at§§ 240(a), 245.

An extensive and detailed list of the U.S. registration locations for domestic partnerships,
which number nearly eighty-five, is available online. The site also provides the cost, applicable
procedures, and a list of registration locations in places outside of the United States. Registration for
Domestic Partnership for the U.S. and Other Countries, http://www.buddybuddy.com/d-p-reg.html
(last visited Jan. I 0, 2006).
32.

33.
According to the National Lesbian & Gay Journalists Association, an estimated 4,300
public and private employers in the U.S. now provide domestic partner benefits to gay and
lesbian employees. Domestic Partner Benefits Overview, http://www.nlgja.org/pubs/DP/DPovrvw.
html (last visited Apr. I, 2006).
34.

See

supra note 4 and accompanying text.

If a home-drawn will fails to meet the formality requirements for execution of a will, the
decedent's estate passes by intestacy.
35.
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A. Challenge of a Validly Executed Will
Same-sex couples face an additional hurdle compared to opposite-sex
married couples because their relatives may be able to more easily challenge
their wills on the grounds of undue influence. If an individual in a same-sex
marriage or civil union leaves his or her estate to the partner, the will is sub
ject to contest by the heirs who would otherwise take possession through
intestate succession.36 If a court were to set aside the will, these "natural"
heirs would receive the share of the surviving same-sex partner, giving them
standing to challenge the will as written.37
Contestants may challenge a will based on fraud, duress, ·or most likely,
undue influence.38 While courts seldom find undue influence in gifts left to
one's spouse, courts are divided on whether this principle is extended to
unmarried partners-or partners whom the jurisdiction will not recognize.
Undue influence may serve as a basis for invalidating a will devising prop
erty to a same-sex partner.39 In Lamborn v. Kirkpatrick, the court invalidated
for undue influence a will that devised one-half of the estate to the dece
dent's mistress.40 The court used the couple's illicit cohabitation as a basis
for finding undue influence.41 Similarly, the court in Will of Kaufmann cited
undue influence in invalidating the will of a testator who left his entire es
tate to his domestic partner with whom he had a homosexual relationship.42
If a court treated partners to a same-sex marriage or civil union as illicitly
cohabitating, it could be enough to raise the presumption of undue influ
ence, opening the door for challenge by the intestate heirs.43
The court in In re Baird's Estate announced the rule as placing the bur
den of proof on the beneficiary to disprove undue influence if the
beneficiary and the testator share a "confidential relationship" and the bene
ficiary assisted in preparation or execution of the will.44 Additionally,
36.

Nancy J. Knauer, The September 11 Attacks and Surviving Same-Sex Partners: Defining
75 TEMP. L. REV. 3 1 , 39 (2002).

Family Through Tragedy,

37.

See UNIF.

38.

See Lamborn

39.

See, e.g.,

40.

Lamborn, 50

PROBATE CODE§ 2-1 02 ( 1 990).
v. Kirkpatrick, 50 P.2d 542 (Colo. 1 935).

Will of Kaufman, 205 N.E.2d 864 (N.Y. 1 965).
P.2d at 544.

4 I. Other courts have found that illicit relationships raise the presumption of undue influ
ence. See, e.g., Glider v. Melinski, 25 N. W.2d 379, 388 (Iowa 1 947) (announcing that influence
obtained by immoral conduct-specifically in the context of adulterous relationships-raises the
presumption of undue influence).
42.

Kaufman,

205 N.E.2d at 864.

43. See Lamborn, 50 P.2d at 544 ("We deem i t proper to attach to illicit cohabitation . . . [a]
moral basis for requiring an affirmative showing against the existence of undue influence from one
who is shown to be guilty of illicit cohabitation . . . .") ; accord Kaufman, 205 N.E.2d at 864. But see
Estate of Sarabia, 270 Cal. Rptr. 560 (Ct. App. 1 990) (not treating a will as "unnatural" merely
because it named the decedent's partner); Evans v. May, 923 S.W.2d 7 1 2, 7 1 4- 1 5 (Tex. Ct. App.
1 990) (stating that the "elements of undue influence must exist in order to prevail" on such a claim
and that a thirty year relationship as a "lifemate" did not constitute undue influence as a matter of
law, regardless of the type of relationship).
44.

In re Baird's

Estate, 168 P. 5 6 1 (Cal. 1 9 1 7).
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because married couples-presumably same-sex married couples as well
often prepare their wills jointly, if the court follows the rule of In re Baird's
Estate, the surviving partner in a same-sex relationship may face a will con
test based on the "confidential relationship" and assistance in will
45
preparation or execution.
Allowing inheritance through intestacy would also reduce the incentive
to challenge a will leaving the estate to a same-sex partner. If same-sex part
46
ners are seen as the "natural objects of the testator's bounty," invalidation
on the grounds of undue influence would require "strong evidence that the
47
will was not the result of the testator's free and independent judgment."
•

•

B.

Home-Drawn Wills and Defects in Execution
Leading to Invalidity

Testators may prefer to write their own wills at home for a variety of
reasons, such as reduced expense, belief that this method is valid and that
the probate court will follow their testamentary plans, or for privacy con
cerns. Gay and lesbian couples may favor home-drawn wills because the
partners are closeted or prefer not to publicly consult with an attorney about
sensitive relationship matters.48 Although validly-executed home-drawn
wills generally work perfectly well, testators who fail to comply with re
quired formalities for the execution of a valid will may have their estates
pass through intestacy.
All wills-whether home-drawn or drafted by an attorney-must meet
certain requirements; failure to comply with a formality is likely to result in
the invalidation of the will. The required formalities vary from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction, but generally require the will to be 1) in writing, 2) signed by
the testator, and 3) attested by credible witnesses.49 When attorneys are in45 .

/d. at 56J.

46. Courts consider spouses of decedents to be "natural objects of the testator's bounty," and
therefore generally refuse to find undue influence when the spouse is the beneficiary under the
decedent's will. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON WILLS,
TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 264 (3d ed. 2002).
47.
(2003).

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS§ 8.3 cmt. f

48.
Several websites provide specific estate planning information tailored to gay and lesbian
couples, citing common concerns about privacy, confidentiality, and discomfort consulting lawyers
about sensitive issues. See, e.g. , http://www.gaywill.com (last visited Feb. 7, 2006); http://
www.gaylawnet.com (last visited Feb. 7, 2006); http: //www.le-gal.org/site (last visited Feb. 7,
2006). Rainbowlaw.com, a website that provides various legal documents, states that "[s]ome gay
men and lesbians feel intimidated by law and lawyers." http://www.rainbowlaw.com/html/estate
planning.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2006). One of the testimonials from the website indicates that not
knowing "who is 'gay friendly' or not" is a factor in choosing to draft one's will at home. Rainbow
law.com, http://www.rainbowlaw.com/html/testimonials.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2006).
49. The Uniform Probate Code, section 2-502 requires the will to be in writing, signed by
the testator or another individual in the testator's conscious presence, and attested by two witnesses,
each of whom signed "within a reasonable time after . . . witness[ing] either the signing of the will
. . . or the testator's acknowledgement of that signature or acknowledgement of the will." UNJF.
PROBATE CODE§ 2-502(3) (2004). States that do not follow the UPC base their required formalities
on either the Statute of Frauds of 1 677 or the Wills Act of 1 8 37. WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 46,
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volved in the preparation, occasionally a will fails to meet one of the statu
tory formalities and is held invalid;50 with home-drawn wills this is even
more likely to happen. In Estate of McKellar, the court invalidated a home
drawn will simply because one of the attesting witnesses signed without
having seen the testatrix write any portion of the will, sign it, or acknowl
51
edge her signature. The jurisdiction required the witnesses either to witness
the testatrix's signing of the document or her acknowledgement of her sig
52
nature. Despite having the requisite number of witnesses, and having met
·
the other formalities of execution, the will failed. Clear evidence that it was
the intent of the testatrix to create a will and dispose of her property through
the will could not overcome the failure to precisely meet the formalities. A
will can also fail to qualify as validly executed if the testator signs some
place other than at the end of the document,53 the witnesses sign outside of
the presence of the testator, 54 the witnesses receive a gift under the will,55 or
the witnesses are otherwise not credible or competent.56 If same-sex couples
choose home-drawn wills, the chance that a mistake in execution will lead
to intestacy is a matter of serious concern.
C. Failure to Execute a Will
Individuals who die intestate fail to execute wills prior to death for a va
riety of reasons. A survey has shown that "age and wealth are good
57
predictors of will-making." Some people might choose not to undertake the
expense of a will if they believe that intestacy closely reflects their preferred
disposition of their estates. Partners to a same-sex marriage or civil union
are likely protected by the intestacy statutes where the marriage or union
occurred58 and so may forget to execute a will upon leaving the jurisdiction,
at 167-68. The UPC provision is similar to non-UPC state statutes, but it is arguably more forgiving
of mistakes in execution when read in conjunction with the "harmless error" provisions of section 2503. That section allows the proponent of a will to establish by clear and convincing evidence that
the will constitutes the testator's intent, despite a defect in a required formality. UNIF. PROBATE
CODE§ 2-503.
50.

For examples of attorney error causing failure of proper execution of a will, see Bi320 P.2d 1 6 (Cal. 1 958) and Ward v. Arnold, 328 P.2d 1 64 (Wash. 1 958).

ankanja v. Irving,

51.

Estate of McKellar, 380 So. 2d 1 273, 1274-75 (Miss. 1980).

52.

Id.

at 1 275.

53. See WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 46, at 179 (stating that a small minority of courts
require the signature to appear at the end of the will).
54. See id. at 1 85-90 (interpreting Stevens v. Casdorph, 508 S.E.2d 610 (W. Va. 1998), in which
the witnesses signed while standing out of the line of vision of the testator, invalidating the will).
55. See id. at 199 (discussing the disqualification of a witness who was a devisee under
the will).
56.

Id.

57.

Id.

at 33 (discussing an empirical study by Mary Louise Fellows et al., Public Attitudes
1 978 AM. B.
FOUND. REs. J. 321, 336-39). Individuals who die at younger ages or who have not amassed much
wealth are Jess likely to have wills than older, wealthier individuals. Fellows et al., supra, at 336-39.

About Property Distribution at Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the United States,

58.

See supra

note 5 and accompanying text.
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or will assume that other states will recognize their spouse's or partner's
intestacy rights. Many couples may not realize that their relationship, while
valid where entered into, fails to protect them at all in the many jurisdictions
that refuse to recognize same-sex marriage or civil unions.
Ill.

MA N Y STATES REFUSE TO RECOGNIZE THE MARRIAGES AND
C IVIL UNIONS OF SAME-SEX C OUPLES

There is widespread state and federal public policy disfavoring same-sex
marriages and civil unions. These public policies may cause very real prob
lems for same-sex couples relying on intestacy statutes in a jurisdiction
other than the one in which the marriage or union occurred.
Many states have refused to recognize same-sex marriage or civil unions
entered into in other states. During the Clinton administration, Congress
enacted DOMA,59 which allowed states to refuse to recognize same-sex mar
riage or its equivalent notwithstanding the requirements of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause. DOMA interprets the Full Faith and Credit Clause to
contain an exception to the requirement of recognizing and giving effect to
the "public act[s], record[s], or judicial proceeding[s] of any other State."6()
Offense to notions of the state's public policy is sufficient to disregard val
idly entered-into marriages by same-sex individuals.61
In addition to the federal legislation, the November 2004 elections re
sulted in eleven state constitutional amendments that prevent same-sex
62
marriage. These states joined six others that had already passed similar
amendments.63 Moreover, President Bush vowed to make a federal constitu
tional amendment banning same-sex marriage a priority of his second
term.64
Case law accords with the refusal to recognize same-sex marriage and
civil unions.65 Burns v. Burns66 was the first reported appellate decision ad59.

28 U.S.C. § 1 738C (2006).

60.

Id.

61. See id. DOMA imposes no limits on bases states can rely upon to disregard same-sex
marriages.
62.

LAMBDA Daily Headlines, The Advocate, A Year After Ruling, Nation Remains Divided
Nov. 1 5, 2004, http://www. advocate.com/news-detail_ekti d06950.asp.

Over Gay Marriage,

63.

Id.

64.

Id.

65. See Smelt v. County of Orange, 374 F. Supp. 2d 861, (C.D. Cal. 2005); Wilson v. Ake,
354 F. Supp. 2d 1 298 (M.D. Fla. 2005); Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa, 77
P.3 d 45 1 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003); Lane v. Albanese, No. FA044002 1 28S, 2005 WL 896 1 29, at *3
(Conn. Mar 1 8, 2005); Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 1 70 (Conn. App. 2002); Lewis v. Harris,
875 A.2d 259 (N.J. Ct. App. Div. 2005); Hennefeld v. Twp. of Montclair, 22 N.J. Tax 1 66 (Tax Ct.
2005); Samuels v. New York State Dep't of Health, No. 98084, 2006 WL 346465, at *6 (N.Y. App.
Div. Feb. 16, 2006); Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1 999). But see Knight v. Superior
Court, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 687 (Ct. App. 2005) (finding that the enactment of a domestic partnership
statute was not a legislative creation of same-sex marriage contrary to the state constitutional provi
sion limiting marriage to one man and one woman).
66.

Bums v. Bums, 560 S.E.2d 47 (Ga. App. 2002).
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67
dressing the interstate recognition of a Vermont same-sex civil union. In
Burns, a heterosexual couple entered into a child custody consent decree
68
following their divorce. The parties agreed that neither of them would visit
or reside with the couple's joint children "during any time where such party
cohabits with or has overnight stays with any adult to which such party is
not legally married or to whom party is not related within the second de
69
gree." After the divorce, the former wife entered into a civil union in
10
Vermont with her female companion, and the two began living together.
71 The
The former husband filed a motion for contempt of the consent decree.
court found her in violation because she and her partner were not married as
required by the decree for cohabitation. 72 The court noted that a civil union
does not bestow the status of a civil marriage in Vermont,73 and even if it
did, the state of Georgia only recognizes the marriages of individuals of the
74
opposite sex. The court refused to recognize the civil union as equivalent to
marriage for even the limited purpose of fulfilling the requirements of the
consent decree. In effect, the court required the former wife to choose be
tween shared custody of her children and living with her life partner.
Similarly, a refusal to recognize a marriage for the limited purpose of inheri
tance could cause great hardship to individuals.
IV.

STATES CAN RECOGNIZE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE OR C IVIL UNIONS FOR
PURPOSES OF INTESTACY DESPITE REFUSAL TO RECOGNIZE T H E
ARRANGEMENT DUE TO OFFENSE TO NOTIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY

Given the legislation, recent state constitutional amendments, and case
law, can states with fervent public policy opposition to these arrangements
ever recognize same-sex marriage or civil unions for intestacy purposes?
Different components or "incidents" of marriage can and have been recog
nized by courts, even when the marriage as a whole conflicts with the state's
public policy. The reasoning used by courts in the recognition of these "in
valid" marriages can be extended by analogy to include same-sex marriages
or civil unions for purposes of intestacy. Section IV.A argues that the pur
pose of intestacy is to reflect the testator's likely donative intent. Section
IV.B reasons that a court may recognize the marriage for the limited purpose
67.

Barbara J. Cox, Using an "Incidents of Marriage" Analysis When Considering Interstate
Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, 1 3
WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 699, 747 (2004).
Recognition of Same-Sex Couples' Marriages,

68. Burns, 560 S.E.2d at 48. At least one purpose of the consent decree was to prevent the
children from exposure to numerous sexual partners of their parents by limiting the partners in the
household to spouses. See Cox, supra note 67, at 750.
69.

560 S.E.2d at 48.

70.

Id.

71.

Id.

72.

Id.

(discussing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (2002)).

73.

Id.

74.

560 S.E.2d at 49.
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of avoiding intestacy, while still refusing to recognize the relationship in
other contexts. Section IV.C contends that courts may balance the state's
interests in refusing to recognize same-sex unions with the public policy in
favor of avoiding intestacy. Section IV.D proposes that an additional solu
tion lies in employing a contract theory to avoid the necessity of recognizing
a marriage or union at all.
A. Purposes of Intestacy: Likely Donative Intent
Not including same-sex marriage or civil union partners in the intes
tacy scheme undermines the goal of intestacy statutes, which is effecting
what is statistically likely to be the decedent's donative intent.75 Addition
ally, financially dependent partners do not receive the protection received
by heterosexual spouses. The estate may consist of jointly earned wealth,
and the refusal to recognize the relationship may deprive the surviving
spouse or partner of a source of support for the couple's children.76 Surviv
ing same-sex spouses or partners to a civil union similarly lack protection
from intentional or accidental disinheritance. Protection through intestacy,
therefore, may achieve important societal goals. Intestate succession func
tions as a default rule that attempts to approximate the manner in which
testators would have disposed their estates if they had valid wills.77 There
are four major policies underlying model probate codes.78 First and fore
most, they attempt to reflect likely donative intent.79 Secondly, intestacy
attempts to fairly and equitably distribute property among family mem
bers.80 A third objective is to "protect the financially dependent family" of
81
the decedent. Giving the estate to the surviving spouse probably reflects
the likely intent of the decedent, in that the surviving spouse probably lost
a source of income and would use that income to support any minor chil-

75. See Martin L. Fried, The Uniform Probate Code: Intestate Succession and Related Mat
55 ALB. L. REV. 927, 929 ( 1992) (stating that the Uniform Probate Code is based on
"prevailing patterns in wills as a guide in determining what the person who fails to execute a will
would probably want."). There is nothing to indicate that parties to a same-sex marriage or civil
union would dispose of their estates differently by virtue of being same-sex, rather than opposite
sex, couples.
ters,

76.
The Uniform Probate Code treats adopted children the same as biological children, but
same-sex couples are denied the right to jointly adopt children in many places. UNIF. PROBATE
CODE § 2 - 1 14 (amended 1993). If the children were the biological progeny of the surviving spouse
or partner, or adopted only by the surviving spouse or partner, intestacy laws would not protect them
from disinheritance.
77.

See Fried, supra

note 75.

Marissa J. Holob, Respecting Commitment: A Proposal to Prevent Legal Barriers From
Obstructing the Effectuation of Intestate Goals, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1 492.
78.

79.

Id.

80.

Id.

at 1500.

81.

Cristy G . Lomenzo, Note: A Goal-Based Approach to Drafting Intestacy Provisions for
46 HASTINGS L.J. 94 1 , 947 ( 1995) (quoting Fellows et al.,
supra note 57).

Heirs Other than Surviving Spouses,
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dren the couple might have. A fourth purpose is to "promote and encour. ,,B2
age the nuclear fam1, y.
Case law supports the idea that "laws concerning intestate succession
are designed to effect the orderly distribution of property for decedents
B3
who lacked either the foresight or the diligence to make wills." Spouses
are favored under the laws of intestate succession because they are statisti
84
cally the most likely to be the object of testators' bounty. Additionally,
B5
the law protects surviving spouses from disinheritance. Spouses receive
legal protections under American law not afforded to other family mem
bers.
B.

Recognition of "Incidents of Marriage" without Full Recognition
of Continued Validity of the Marriage

Intestacy is a unique area in which courts have gone to great lengths to
recognize relationships-despite their conflict with public policy-in or
der to benefit the survivor of a "marital" relationship. Ideally, same-sex
couples would prefer that states recognize as valid in their entirety their
B6
marriages or unions. Short of that, however, courts can and should recog
nize the marriage or union when the right to inherit through intestacy is
87
the particular "incident" involved. The different incidents of marriage
invoke different public policies, and the right to inherit through intestacy
is an area in which courts have regularly preferred to resolve doubts in
favor of the validity of the marriage. In some cases, they have done so de
spite a general refusal to honor the marriage during the lives of the parties.
In intestacy proceedings, courts may recognize marriages that are not
valid in the litigation forum by using the "incidents of marriage" ap
proach. Three cases illustrate the strides that courts have taken in order to
recognize a marriage in cases in which personal property would otherwise
pass by intestacy. These cases involve individuals claiming an intestate
share of their spouses' estates when the jurisdiction would not have recog
nized the marriages during the couples' lives.
In Miller v. Lucks, the court recognized intestacy rights for an interra
cial marriage, despite a general refusal to recognize interracial marriages.B8

82. Lomenzo, supra note 8 1 , at 947 (quoti ng Fellows et al., supra note 57, at 324). Although
the recognition of intestacy rights for same-sex couples does not further this purpose, this goal is
arguably less important than the earlier-listed purposes. Perhaps the increased acceptance of same
sex relationships will lead to such relationships being included in the ambit of "nuclear family."
83.

King v. Riffee, 1 72 W. Va. 586, 589 (1 983).

84.

Id.

85. Id.; see also UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (amended 1 993) (providing for elective share
of the estate in the event the testator disinherited the surviving spouse).
86. For same-sex couples, recognition of the marriage or union in its entirety would be ideal,
as the couples would receive all of the benefits attendant to marriage.
Cox, supra note 67, at 7 1 8.

87.

See

88.

Miller v. Lucks, 36 So. 2 d 140 (Miss. 1 948).
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In Miller, an African American woman died intestate in the state of
Mississipr-i, and her surviving husband, a white man, claimed the spouse's
89
share of the intestate estate. The couple had validly married in Illinois,
which did not prevent interracial marriage.90 The court stated that Missis
sippi's anti-miscegenation laws prohibited the recognition of a marriage
between African Americans and whites and that it served to prevent "per
sons of Negro and white blood from living together in this state in the
91
relationship of husband and wife." Notwithstanding a marriage that vio
lated the state's public policy, the Mississippi court recognized the
marriage for the limited purpose of allowing the surviving spouse to in
herit property. The court reasoned as follows:
[T]o permit one of the parties to such a marriage to inherit property in
this state from the other does no violence to the purpose of Sections
of our Constitution and

459

of the Code of

I 942.

263

What we are requested

to do is simply to recognize this marriage to the extent only of permitting
one of the parties thereto to inherit from the other property in Missis
92
sippi, and to that extent it must and will be recognized.

While the court would never have validated the marriage while the
couple lived in the state, it granted the benefit of inheritance through intes
tacy as a single, recognizable incident of marriage.
9
The court in In re Dalip Singh Bir's Estate 3 recognized intestacy
rights for an unlawful polygynous marriage. A man died intestate in Cali
fornia, and his two wives living in India sought to share in his estate.94 The
decedent lawfully entered into the polygynous marriage under the laws of
the Punjab Province in India.95 The trial court determined that only the first
wife had a claim to his estate because public policy concerns did not allow
the court to recognize both marriages as valid.96 The appellate court,
however, held that the public policy rule only applies "if decedent had
attempted to cohabit with his two wives in California. Where only the
question of descent of property is involved, 'public policy' is not af
fected."97 Similar reasoning is available for application to other types of
relationships of which the state's public policy disapproves, such as
same-sex marriage or civil unions.

89.

Id.

90.

Id.

91.

Id.

at 1 4 1 .

at 142.

92.

Id.

93.

In re

94.

Id.

95.

Id.

96.

Id.

97.

Id.

Dalip Singh Bir's Estate, 1 88 P.2d 499 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1 948).

at 502.
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The court struggled with the marriage of an uncle and his niece in In re
98
May's Estate, but found it sufficient for intestacy purposes. The couple
lived in the state of New York, traveled to Rhode Island for the marriage,
and returned to New York two weeks later.99 Rhode Island's laws did not
prohibit nuptials when the "marriage solemnized is between persons of the
Jewish faith within the degrees of affinity and consanguinity allowed by
100
their religion." The state of New York viewed such marriages as incestu
11
ous and impermissible. 0 The court determined that if the couple had sought
recognition in the state while both individuals were alive and domiciled
102
there, the marriage would have been void and without effect. The marriage
was valid where created, however, and the court recognized it insofar as it
3
awarded the surviving spouse the intestate share of the estate.10
Some courts, however, have not been so generous as to recognize intes
104
tacy rights when the marriage violates the state's public policy,
"particularly if an attempt has been made by residents of a state to evade the
1
law." 05 Some courts have determined that these invalid marriages constitute
a nullity, and they will not recognize the marriage for any purpose, includ
ing intestacy. In Eggers v. Olson, the court held as follows:
[P]ersons domiciled in this state cannot evade the inhibition of the law by
going to another state, and there marrying and then returning to this state
to reside and have such marriage recognized by the law of this state. Such
marriage is void, and confers no rights of person or property.

106

Where there has been no attempt to evade state laws, however, it makes
little sense to deny rights of inheritance to the survivor of a good-faith same
sex marriage or civil union. If a couple legally marries in state A, with no
attempt to evade the laws of state B, and later moves to state B, where one
partner dies, it should not evoke the same vigorous objection as a deliberate
attempt to avoid state B's laws. In striking down California's anti
miscegenation statute, the California Supreme Court in Perez v. Lippold
stated, "In determining whether the public interest requires the prohibition
of a marriage between two persons, the state may take into consideration
matters of legitimate concern to the state."101 Although the deliberate attempt
to evade state laws is a valid state concern in determining of intestacy rights,

98.

In re

99.

Id.

1 00.

Id.

May's Estate, 114 N.E.2d 4 (N.Y. 1 953).

at 5.

IOI.

Id.

at 6.

102.

Id.

at 7.

1 03 .

Id.

104. See In re Shun T. Takahashi's Estate, 129 P.2 d 217 (Mont. 1 942); Eggers
483 (Okla. 1924).
105.

Perez v. Lippold, 1 98 P.2d 1 7, 38 (Cal. 1 948) (Shenk, J., dissenting).

1 06.

Eggers v. Olson, 23 1 P. 483 (Okla. 1 924).

107.

Perez,

198 P.2 d at 21.

v.

Olson, 23 1 P.
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this does not apply to the case of couples whose marriage or civil union was
entered into honestly and validly in another jurisdiction.
The courts in Miller, Dalip Singh Bir 's Estate, and May 's Estate took
great strides in recognizing marriage and its importance, even in relation
ships contrary to the state's professed public policy. When the mere
distribution of a decedent's estate is at stake, it stands to reason that courts,
consistent with their strong exception to same-sex relationships, could rec
ognize the marriage incident that provides for intestacy rights of the
surviving partners to a validly entered-into same-sex marriage, civil union,
or commitment ceremony.
C. Weighing Competing Public Policies Allows States to Recognize
Same-Sex Marriage or Civil Unions despite Intestacy Statutes
that Fail to Provide for Same-Sex Inheritance
Many states refuse to recognize same-sex marriage or civil unions based
108
on public policy objections to marriage between people of the same sex.
There are many competing policies at stake in the recognition of intestacy
rights, however, and courts may validly base recognition of the marriage on
the state's intestate succession policies rather than the policies about who
can marry whom.
Courts faced with a question that requires recognition of same-sex mar
riage or civil unions for intestacy purposes can rely upon the policies of the
state that relate to intestate succession rather than those policies implicated
by same-sex relationships. Even if public policy does not support same-sex
marriage or civil unions, the court is not being called upon to recognize or
sanction the relationship during the lives of the parties. The logical public
policy to examine is that related to the purposes behind the intestate succes
sion laws.
The ideals reflected in the intestate succession policies of a state109 apply
with equal force to same-sex couples, especially the protection of the finan
11
cially dependent family. 0 If the estate of a decedent escheats to the state or
is distributed to distant relatives, the state might ultimately bear the costs. If
the decedent leaves behind dependent, non-biological children with no
means of support, they may have to resort to welfare or other state financial
assistance as a result.
A refusal to recognize intestacy rights for same-sex couples is unlikely
to deter same-sex relationships. Professor David Engdahl, who supports the
"incidents of marriage" approach,111 points out that when a marriage prohib
ited by the forum goes undiscovered until after the death of one of the
partners, punishing the survivor by denying rights is ineffective to affirm the

1 08.

See supra

Part III.

109.

See supra

Introduction.

1 1 0.

Lomenzo, supra note 8 1 (quoting Fellows et al., supra note 57).

1 11.

See supra

Part IV.B.; Cox, supra note 67.
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Refusing the right of inheritance is

"[a]t best . . . a sterile vindication of the policy of the marriage laws, often at
great human expense to a party . . . whose marital habits did not conform
1 13
mce
. 1 y to th e 1 aw."
Parties to same-sex marriages and civil unions likely have the reasonable
expectation that their estate will pass to their partners upon death, particu
larly if that result follows under the law of the j urisdiction where the
1 14
Upon leaving that jurisdiction, couples may
marriage or union occurred.
be surprised to learn, perhaps too late, of the disparate approaches, leading
to a "stunning lack of uniformity of treatment of surviving same-sex part
1 15
The couples' reasonable expectations can and should be honored
ners."
where doing so does not require the state to sanction or encourage the for
mation of such relationships.
Although encouraging nuclear families is a purpose behind the intestacy
1 16
the balance should tip in favor of the intentions of the decedent. At

laws,

the point where an individual has already made his or her life choices and
has died leaving a surviving partner, the policy of encouraging nuclear fami
lies does not apply. Nor would it serve as an example that might encourage
others to form nuclear families; rather, it merely provides a warning to simi
larly situated individuals of the importance of having a valid will.
In short, using the state's public policy concerning marriage and family
protection allows fulfillment of the couple's reasonable expectations sur
rounding the disposition of their estate, especially when recognition does no
1 11
violence to the policies behind the prohibition.
Weighing the applicable
advantages that come out of allowing a surviving same-sex partner to share
1 18
allows courts to

in the estate with the policies against same-sex marriage

find in favor of this limited, retrospective recognition of same-sex marriage.
1 19

Like the many cases that have recognized an illicit or defective marriage,

even a state's fundamental disagreement with recognition during the lives of
the parties can be overcome.

D. A Solution in Contract Law
The law of contracts also supplies courts with a solution to the problem
of intestate succession rights of parties to a same-sex marriage or civil un
ion. If a court treats the intestate share as an implied contractual right, it can

112.

David E. Engdahl, Proposal for a Benign Revolution in Marriage Law and Marriage
55 IowA L. REV. 56, I 05- 106 ( 1 969).

Conflicts Law,

1 1 3.

Cox, supra note 67, at 721-22 (quoting Engdahl, supra note 112, at 1 06).

1 14.

See supra

note 5 and accompanying text.

115.

Knauer, supra note 36, at 78.

1 16.

See

1 17 .

See supra

118.

Arguably, these policies become moot upon the death o f one partner.

1 1 9.

See supra

Lomenzo, supra note 8 1 .
Part IV.
Section IV.B and accompanying text.
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lawfully respect the decedent's likely donative intent without recognizing
the marriage. Case law demonstrates the successful use of contract law to
avoid the problem of public policy.
120
the court used contract law to validate a relation
In Marvin v. Marvin,
ship that was otherwise in violation of the state's public policy. The plaintiff
brought suit against an opposite-sex former cohabitant for breach of con
121
tract.
She claimed she had an oral agreement based on their non-marital
relationship to share equally their earnings and any property accumulated by
122
Although the court recognized its role in the promotion of the insti

them.

tution of marriage, it stated, "perpetuation of judicial rules which result in
an inequitable distribution of property accumulated during a nonmarital re
123
lationship is neither a just nor an effective way of carrying out that policy."
The court seemed to recognize that it should not punish the plaintiff for her
relationship and that an inequitable outcome would not deter this type of
relationship. Other courts have established that even unmarried, cohabitating
.
.
1 24
parties are free to enter mto contracts.
Courts should recognize intestate succession as an implied contractual
right attendant to same-sex couples' marriage or union contract that is
wholly valid where entered into. By shifting the focus from the relationship
the parties had before death to their status as lawfully contracting parties,
the court is free to dispose of the estate in the same way the decedent likely
125
would have chosen had he or she had the opportunity.

v. REQUIREMENT OF CIVIL UNION, COMMITMENT CEREMONY,
OR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE STATUS
Even if a court is willing in some situations to apply the intestate suc
cession laws to benefit the surviving partner to a same-sex relationship,
what qualifies as an appropriate same-sex relationship might remain unclear.
Should a court automatically give the intestate estate to a surviving same
sex partner? How long must the relationship have lasted in order to qualify?
Should the court have to examine the relationship, its length, and the level of
commitment?
In order to treat same-sex marriage or civil union as similar as possible
to heterosexual marriage, the recognition of intestacy rights should be Jim-

1 20.

Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 1 06 (Cal. 1976).

121.

Id.

1 22.

Id.

1 23.

Id.

at 122.

1 24. See, e.g. , Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405, 407 (Ct. App. 1 988) ("Adults who
voluntarily l ive together and engage in sexual relations are competent to contract respecting their
earnings and property rights."). An exception to this general rule prohibits an express contract "ex
pressly and inseparably based upon an illicit consideration of sexual services." Marvin, 557 P.2d at
1 1 4.
1 25 . According to Marissa J. Holob, "[m]ost partners in committed relationships leave the
majority of their estate to their surviving partner." Holob, supra note 78, at 1 5 1 2.
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ited to those who have actually married, been civilly united, or participated
in a commitment ceremony that the couple treats as equivalent to marriage.
Requiring a formal commitment avoids fraud, makes a distinction between
people who are simply "living together" for a limited duration, and reduces
the need for inquiry into-and litigation about-the substance of the rela
tionship.
In keeping with the majority of states that have abolished common law
marriage, courts should recognize intestacy rights only for same-sex couples
that are formally committed. States have sought to delineate rights that favor
formal commitment over "shacking up" and consequently have abolished
the traditional protection of unmarried heterosexual couples known as
126
common law marriage.
The reasons center mainly around the fact that
127
"informal associations were vulnerable to fraud."
In the states that still
recognize common law marriage, the parties must intend that their relation
ship be a marriage, and couples who are simply living together cannot claim
128

the benefits of common law marriage.

Because heterosexual claims of intestacy rights are limited by the aboli
tion of common law marriage, same-sex relationships should be similarly
restricted. Same-sex couples living together without formal commitment
should be subjected to the same standards as heterosexual couples. If a con
cern of the state is that heterosexual couples would not want their estates to
go to a partner in a relationship of short duration or informal commitment,
the same concern applies with equal force to same-sex couples. Intestacy
was designed to reflect the likely donative intent of married individuals, not
129
the intent of roommates or people living together casually.
The same-sex
nature of the relationship by itself should not indicate that the relationship is
so serious or formal as to be considered a marriage. This distinction is iden
tical to that faced by couples in a jurisdiction that does not recognize
common law marriage. Evidence of a formal commitment also avoids the
possibility of fraud. Therefore, unless the couple is formally committed
through marriage, civil union, or formal commitment ceremony, courts
should exclude the surviving same-sex partner from intestate succession.

1 26. Only a few states recognize common law marriage, and of those, some recognize only
the marriages that were contracted before a certain date. The states that recognize it are as follows:
Alabama, Colorado, Georgia (if created before January 1 , 1 997), Idaho (if created before January 1 ,
1 996), Iowa, Kansas, Montana, New Hampshire (for inheritance purposes only), Ohio (if created
before October 10, 1 99 1 ), Oklahoma (possibly only if created before November 1 , 19980klahoma's laws and court decisions may conflict over whether common law marriages formed in
that state after November 1, 1 998 will be recognized), Pennsylvania (if created before September
2003), Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Washington, D.C. Alternative to Marriage
Project Fact Sheet, Common Law Marriage, http://www.unmarried.org/commonlaw.pdf (last visited
Feb. 24, 2006).
1 27 .

Holob, supra note 78, at 1 5 1 6- 1 7 (citing Ellen Kandoian, Cohabitation, Common law
75 GEO. L.J. 1 829, 1 8 5 1 ( 1 987)).

Marriage, and the Possibility of a Shared Moral Life,

1 28.

Sol Lovas, When Is a Family Not a Family ? Inheritance and the Taxation of Inheritance
24 IDAHO L. REV. 353, 361 ( 1 988).

within the Non-Traditional Family,

1 29.

See supra

Section IV.A.
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Another benefit of including only formally committed same-sex couples
is that it avoids the need for litigation regarding the substance of the rela
tionship. The court in

In re Estate of Lenherr130

summed it up perfectly by

stating that in a time of "widespread travel and ease of mobility, it would
create inordinate confusion and defy the reasonable expectations of citizens
whose marriage is valid in one state to hold that marriage invalid else
131
where." As long as the couple in question is validly married, civilly united,
or committed in a way equivalent to marriage, courts should allow the survi
vor to inherit through intestate succession through his or her partner. This
leads to a uniform result that does no harm to public policy that might oth
erwise prevent the couple from legal recognition or receipt of benefits from
the state during the lives of the parties. It simply distributes the likely mutu
ally gained wealth in the manner most likely to be what the parties would
have done if given the opportunity to create a will before death. The state
need not approve, encourage, or validate the relationship. The bright-line
standard allows the disposition with minimum litigation, offers no special
benefits to the survivor, and comports with how the majority of Americans
1 32
would prefer to distribute their estate.
Requiring a formal commitment is
consistent with treating the relationship like a marriage, even for such a nar
row, limited purpose.
CONCLUSION
Intestacy rights for formally committed, same-sex couples do not offend
public policy; therefore, courts can recognize such rights, even if they do not
recognize the relationship during the lives of the partners. People have many
varied motivations for forming intimate relationships, but it seems unlikely
that allowing same-sex partners to inherit through intestacy would encour
age the formation of same-sex relationships. Intestacy merely provides a
safety net for those who do not execute wills, or whose wills fail for some
reason. It also reflects the likely intent of the decedent to dispose of the es
tate in favor of his or her closest equivalent to a spouse. It does not cost the
state anything, nor does it require the state to allocate scarce resources to
couples whose relationships contravene public policy. It merely asks the
court to recognize the right of a partner, at death, to have the benefit of sup
port from the decedent. In this way, it protects and rewards the emotional
commitment and financial interdependence between committed partners,
and preserves the wealth that partners jointly generate.
Courts recognizing major changes that are contrary to public policy have
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been met with forceful opposition.
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1 33 . The decision i n Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass.
2003), legalizing same-sex marriage, arguably led to the inclusion of eleven proposed amendments
to state constitutions on the November 2004 ballots that banned gay maniage, all of which passed.
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intestate succession, however, is not likely to create the same backlash as the
wide-sweeping recognition of the right to marriage. As with the other cases
in which courts have merely recognized a single incident of marriage, this
small move of recognition of intestacy rights for same-sex couples is not
likely to receive the same public or private attention as full recognition of
same-sex marriage. The only people whose lives it may dramatically affect
are parties in same-sex relationships who die without a valid will leaving
their estate to their partner. Allowing intestacy rights will have little or no
effect on the state, especially compared to the benefit it bestows on the sur
viving partner.

Associated Press, Voters pass all 11 bans on gay marriage: Ballot initiatives pave the way for new
court battles, Nov. 3, 2004, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/6383353.
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